

Chapter 3

Modality and Validation

Henry WYLD
Université de Cergy-Pontoise
CLILLAC-ARP Paris 7

By combining subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought, never passes from sense to reference, never from thought to its truth value.

(Frege, *On Sense and Reference*)

INTRODUCTION

It may fairly safely be said that the most central kinds of modality have to do with judgments and attitudes concerning either (i) the *truth* of a proposition or (ii) the subjective anticipation of a proposition's becoming (or not becoming) *reality*, whether this involve or not the intermediary of an agent-participant and whether or not some form of impingement on the latter by the modal subject is additionally at stake¹.

The following examples in English may serve to illustrate these two broad categories:

i. truth, estimation of truth, etc.

(assertive) *John left yesterday.*

(epistemic) *Liz may/might/must be working upstairs.*

(evidential) *He allegedly stole the items from the local supermarket.*

1. As will be seen below, the far from negligible category of *evaluative* modality, not discussed *per se* in this chapter, is present as an obligatory component of most types of modal attitude of the second type.

ii. subjectively-anticipated reality

(deontic) *You must/should inform them immediately.*

(boulomaic²) *She wants/hopes/expects to meet them again next week;*

They were afraid the roof would fall in.

In what follows, the two properties in question here – that of a proposition’s being true (or not true) and that of a proposition’s becoming (or not becoming) reality – will be subsumed under a single concept, that of *validation*. Validation will be construed, along with modalisation, as an operation applying to a propositional construct, and it will be assumed that it is via the operation of validation that a proposition takes on a *stabilized referential value*³.

The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between the operations of validation and modalisation within the general framework of the *Theory of Enunciative Operations* (T.O.E.⁴) drawing, in particular, on the location theory component of the model. In T.O.E., an utterance is viewed as a construct resulting from the application of a series of operations to a propositional object, itself the product of a series of operations applying to notional entities. Such operations result in the construction of relations holding between, variously, notions, predicative-level constituents and enunciative-level coordinates, and it is via relations of this kind that values pertaining to such categories as diathesis, topicalisation, tensing and aspectualisation are seen to come into being. An advantage of adopting a relational approach to the characterisation of the fundamental form of the utterance is that it allows for validation to be construed as an utterance constitutive operation in its own right, one on a par with such operations as predication and modalisation, with which in traditional approaches, it is often conflated.

Indeed, from an historical point of view, it seems that the need to posit a third concept – one intermediate between predication and modalisation – has only gradually emerged in an evolution from (i) what might be viewed as an essentially mono-operational conception of the utterance associated with the standard Aristotelian construal of predication, via (ii) the emphasis on judgment that informs *Port Royal*’s vision of the utterance in which the operation of modalisation,

2. Subsuming *volitive, desiderative, timitive, etc.*

3. Such referential values are viewed here as constructs of a strictly language reflexive kind and as such make no appeal to any form of reality that might exist externally to the order of language.

4. *Théorie des opérations énonciatives.*

as yet not clearly distinct from predication, is at least explicitly posited; (iii) with Bally's *modus-dictum* conception of the utterance, the relational characterisation is taken a step further but still falls short of separating validation from either predication or modalisation. Arguably, it is in the writings of the logician Frege that first appears an awareness of the need to distinguish an operation lying between predication and modalisation. Concerning this point, take for example his three-level analysis of assertion in the article entitled "*The Thought*" (Frege 1918 [trad. 1956]) where, crucially, the distinction is made between what is termed the "recognition of the truth of a thought" (characterised as an *internal* act of judgment) and the public expression of the same – a distinction which I believe to be not so far removed from the one that I wish to promote here in operational terms between, respectively, validation and assertive modality:

[...] two things must be distinguished in an indicative sentence: the content, which it has in common with the corresponding sentence-question, and the assertion. The former is the thought, or at least contains the thought. So it is possible to express the thought without laying it down as true. Both are so closely joined in an indicative sentence that it is easy to overlook their separability. Consequently we may distinguish:

1. the apprehension of a thought – thinking
2. the recognition of the truth of a thought – judgment
3. the manifestation of this judgment – assertion⁵.

(Frege, "*The Thought*" (1918), trad. Geach P., 1956: 294)

This characterisation of the assertive utterance is, on our reading, highly suggestive too of Culioli's position when he defines assertion in the form of a series of embedded operations bearing on a predicative relation:

Si j'asserte p, j'asserte (je tiens à dire que je sais) qu'il existe un événement, et que p est l'événement en question⁶.

(Culioli 1990: 131)

5. Cf. also Frege (1969 [1979: 2]): "Inwardly to *recognize something as true* is to *make a judgement*, and to give expression to this judgement is to make an assertion." Note that the term "judgment" is used here to refer to a submodal operation.

6. Or in a slightly different formulation: "*je tiens à dire que je pense (etc) que <p> est le cas.*" (Culioli 1999b: 96).

1. THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES

Before examining in detail the exact nature of the relations defining respectively validation and modalisation, it may be helpful to recall very briefly a few basic features of T.O.E.

At the most abstract level, the fundamental form of the utterance is characterised as an oriented binary relation holding between a propositional content and the situation of enunciation, as expressed by the formula $\lambda \underline{\in} \text{Sit}$. This highly compact representation unpacks in the following way:

- λ (standing for *lexis*) represents an assemblage of notions comprising a predicator term (notated “r”) and, prototypically, two arguments: a source and a goal argument respectively notated a and b. This yields the structure $\langle a \text{ r } b \rangle$, denoting a *predicative relation*.
- “Sit”, the locator term in the formula, subsumes what is known as the utterance’s *referential system*. This takes the form of a chain of ranked meta-linguistic situations, a minimal version of which is given in (1):

$$(1) \quad \lambda \quad \underline{\in} \quad \text{Sit2 (T2,S2)} \quad \underline{\in} \quad \text{Sit1 (T1,S1)} \quad \underline{\in} \quad \text{Sito (To,So)}$$

situation of event	situation of speech	situation of enunciation

[reading from left to right: “lexis located ($\underline{\in}$) relative to the situation of event (Sit2), located relative to the situation of speech (Sit1), located relative to the situation of enunciation (Sito)”]⁷.

The referential system provides the enunciative coordinates of the utterance relative to which the predicative component is located and may be seen as a distant descendent of Reichenbach’s three time points system⁸. One important difference to note however in respect of the latter is that, in contrast to Reichenbach’s system, each rank of metalinguistic situation here comprises two parameters, notated

7. The version of the referential system as it is given in (1) is, in fact, a minimal one in so far as, in practice, the enunciative origin (Sito) frequently undergoes division resulting in certain of its facets being transferred to what I shall refer to as *derived zero-indexed locators* (cf. on this point Culioli, 1999a: 133; 167).

8. Whereas it is possible to posit a fairly straightforward correspondence between the T2-locator and “event time”, it would be misleading to go so far as to suggest that there exists any simple relation of equivalence between Reichenbach’s “time of speech” and T1, or between “reference time” and To; furthermore, the enunciative origin may be spread over two metalinguistic situations of different ranks if a derived origin is brought into play (cf. preceding note).

respectively T and S – T for spatio-temporal and S for subjective –, the inclusion of the S-parameter allowing amongst other things for a more sophisticated treatment of the inherent subjectivity associated with the category of aspect, as well as providing the conditions for an integrated treatment of modality.

2. RELATIONAL DEFINITION OF VALIDATION

Turning now to the main task at hand – the question of the relationship between the operations of validation and modalisation – I wish to begin by focusing on the problem of formulating an exact relational description of the operation of *validation*.

2.1. The *locator* term in the relation defining validation

In past work in T.O.E, the *locator* term in the relation defining validation, when mentioned at all, has generally been taken to be the spatio-temporal coordinate of the “situation of event” – that is, the T2-locator of the referential system – thus situating validation at the interface as it were between predicative and enunciative levels of representation⁹. Culioli himself, however, is extremely laconic on this point and rarely goes beyond speaking of location relative to the referential system *en bloc*, as for example when he defines existential negation using the negative locating operator \notin :

Si l'on se place d'un point de vue métalinguistique, on constate qu'il n'est pas possible de construire un système de représentation qui ne contiendrait pas un opérateur négatif, que j'ai noté \notin : ainsi, \notin **Sit** pourra se gloser “n'est pas repéré par rapport au système de coordonnées énonciatives”, “n'est pas validé”, “n'est pas le cas”.
(Culioli 1990: 94¹⁰)

9. Cf. *inter alia* Bouscaren & Chuquet (1987), Gilbert (1987), Wyld (2001), Dufaye (2001).

10. Cf. also Culioli (1999a: 131) for a similar formulation. An isolated reference to the Sit2 locator functioning as validation locator is however to be found in Culioli (1985): “Lorsqu'on met : <il est venu> \in Sit2 (S2,T2), avec Sit2 on a affaire à une valeur qui me permet d'effectuer tous les calculs par rapport à Sit1 et Sito - ou bien je n'ai pas de valeur assignée : c'est ce qui se passe lorsque je désigne la relation sans qu'elle soit une assertion : lorsque je dis : “il est venu, il n'est pas venu...”, je produis presque pour moi-même ces objets que sont ces relations prédicatives qui sont situées naturellement par rapport à moi locuteur, mais non pas en tant que renvoyant à une événement de telle manière que je puisse dire : c'est vrai, c'est faux. A ce moment-là c'est comme si on avait à la place de Sit2 une parenthèse vide () qui n'a pas de valeur assignée : ça reste en suspens, donc compatible avec une valeur

2.2. Two modes of validation (properties vs events)


In work on the characterisation of the opposition between property and eventive utterances, it was suggested in Wyld (2001: 28ff.) that a distinction might be made between two modes of validation with location relative to the T2-locator being relevant **only in the case of eventive utterances** and with this rank of locator being crucially *absent* in the case of properties. These two modes are given below in (2), which attempts to account for the way in which respectively, eventive and property readings can be constructed from a common predicative construct – in this case, the predicative relation <Liz-play-piano>¹¹.

(2) Wyld (2001)

- events: <λ> ∈ T2 ∈ To

(*Liz is playing the piano, Liz played the piano last night, etc.*)

- properties: <Co-pred.>¹² - To



(*Liz plays the piano, Liz played the piano when she was a child, etc.*)

In more recent work on the event/property distinction¹³, I have come to adopt a slightly different version of this hypothesis, the salient features of which are summed up in the following two points:

a/ The presence or absence of a T2-locator and the location of the predicative construct thereto is still seen as fundamental to the opposition between events and properties but the **relation defining the operation of validation itself is now taken to be situated at the level of the relation with the zero-indexed T-locator in both types of utterance:**

- (3) (property) < Co-pred > ∈ To¹⁴ (*Liz plays the piano.*)

(event) << Co-pred > ∈ T2> ∈ To (*Liz is playing the piano.*)

négative ou positive ; et en dehors de ces deux valeurs, elle reste objet de contemplation, de description, de méditation.” (op.cit.: 68).

11. The locating operator intervening in the relation defining validation is given in bold.

12. Co: sc. “zero rank complement” (grammatical subject).

13. Cf. Wyld (2010).

14. The locating operator intervening in the relation defining validation is again given in bold.

b/ The loc-T2 relation is now used for defining another operation, viz. *quantifiabilisation*, which I will come back to below.

This reformulation crucially exploits the fact that in T.O.E. the all-purpose location operator $\underline{\epsilon}$ can be used to symbolise relational values of varying degrees of abstraction¹⁵. Among these, the following four levels may usefully be distinguished:

- (i) the mere mention of the existence of a relation (notated “loc” or simply “-” in what follows);
- (ii) the specification of the existence or non-existence of a relation: $\underline{\epsilon}$, $\cancel{\underline{\epsilon}}$;
- (iii) the specification of the orientation of an existing relation: $\underline{\epsilon}$, \exists ;
- (iv) the specification of the “micro-value” of location of an existing relation: identification (=), differentiation (\neq) or disconnection(ω).

2.3. Polarity of validation


Returning in the light of the preceding remarks to the task of characterising the relation defining validation, at the most abstract level of representation this may be expressed then by the general formula: λ (loc T2)¹⁶ loc To(d)¹⁷, which, if one chooses to take into account the respectively positive and negative values that the operation can take on, “rewrites” as: λ (loc T2) $\underline{\epsilon}/\cancel{\underline{\epsilon}}$ To(d). This second formula is taken to be equivalent to what in the bifurcation system of representation is construed as “transition to” or “being situated at” the I or E position of the plane of validation¹⁸:

15. Cf. Culioli et al. (1981), Paillard (1992), Wyld (2001).

16. The bracketing here refers to the fact that the “loc-T2 relation” is only relevant in the case of eventive utterances (cf. property/event distinction).

17. Tod: *sc.* derived zero-indexed locator (T-parameter), cf. note 7 *supra*. In the case of “fictive assertions” it is necessary to posit a locator of this type as illustrated for example by conditional utterances (e.g. *If I knew, I would tell you*), where the validation of the predicative relation in the apodosis is contingent on the (fictive) validation of the protasis; also, more generally on our view, when any kind of derived origin is at stake (cf. Culioli’s *origine translatée* and *origine fictive*).

18. Respectively, I (interior) and E (exterior) of the associated notional domain. This system of representation is based on a distinction between two modes of apprehending a predicative relation: (i) that denoted by the IE position, where the predicative relation is apprehended as a “pre-” or “infra-” validated object (“plane of representation”), (ii) that denoted by the I and E positions (“plane of validation”), where the predicative relation is apprehended as an object having undergone



It is important to note that this approach allows for *negatively-polarized* validation, which is not to be confused with – although it often is – *absence* of validation in the sense of apprehension of the predicative construct in a “pre-” or “infra-validated” state, as for example is prototypically the case with clauses containing infinitive verb forms^{19/20}.

2.4. The *locatum* term (validation)

Taking up now the second point mentioned above in our revised hypothesis concerning the event/property distinction – that of using the relation relative to the T2-locator for defining the operation of quantifiabilisation – this is in fact of direct relevance for the characterisation of the *locatum* term in the validation operation, which, hitherto, we have assumed to be unproblematically the “predicative construct *en bloc*”.

More precisely, the position to be defended here draws on the idea that the event/property distinction ultimately stems from the way the verbal-predicator constituent of the predicative relation is apprehended. This is taken to be (i) *intensional* in the case of property utterances (so that the intensional character of the verbal notion is maintained in the surface utterance: *John teaches, John taught before he dropped out*)

validation. On the bifurcation system of representation, cf. *inter alia* Culioli (1990: 104 and 132).

19. Contrary to the not infrequently encountered view that polarity values intervene in the relation defining modality (cf. “assertive polarity”). The need to recognize “negatively-polarized validation” is particularly clear in cases where validation is preconstructed such as for example when counterfactuality is at stake: *You might have broken your leg; He should have been concentrating on finding a solution*. On this point, cf. also Wyld (2014: 287 n.19).

20. Cf. also the case of subjunctive clauses in languages in which subjunctive forms are attested. It should be noted that in practice infinitives and subjunctives mainly occur in external modus + complement clause type constructions where the embedded predicative relation, via its association with the main clause (functioning as external modus), may be seen to have undergone validation (e.g. *I saw her leave; C’est bizarre qu’il soit encore chez lui.*). Cf. on this point Wyld (2014: 291-292).


and (ii) *extensional* in the case of eventive utterances (*John's teaching right now, John taught all morning*). Transition to extensionality in T.O.E. is effected by an operation that goes by the name of *quantifiabilisation*²¹ and I now believe that this operation – specific to the case of eventive utterances, on my view – is best characterised as location relative to a T2-locator, the output of which is a referenceless, eventive construct corresponding to what Culioli refers to as the representation of a validatable state-of-affairs (1999a: 166-67)²².

3. MODALISATION

Moving on now to the problem of identifying the relation defining *modalisation*, firstly, let it be recalled that relational construals of modality in fact have a long history. For *Port Royal*, for example, the act of judgment involves two operations: the mental representation of a grammatical subject and a predicate and the operation of attributing one to the other. As Ducrot and Schaeffer (1995) concisely put it:

Pour Port-Royal, l'assertion unit le prédicat et le sujet à l'intérieur d'une proposition, et, *du même coup*, affirme cette proposition.
(op. cit. p. 699)

The shortcoming of this approach from the point of view of the position being defended here is, as mentioned earlier, the fact that it conflates the operations of modality and predication, and at the same time leaves no independent place for the operation of validation²³:



21. Cf. *inter alia* Culioli (1990: 181-182).

22. Cf. proximity to Frege's *Gedanke* concept.

23. Cf. Le Goffic (1978: 242-243): "Le schéma de départ, assimilant jusqu'à les rendre interchangeables, "jugement", "affirmation" et "proposition", tenable *grosso modo* tant qu'on reste à des énoncés très simples, ne l'est plus dès que l'on entre dans les complexités réelles du langage" (...) "Pour finir, force est de constater que la notion d'affirmation ne peut jouer le rôle qui lui est dévolu, à savoir de ciment, de lien, de passage entre le jugement et la proposition." Similarly, for Buroker (1993): "[Port Royal's] analysis of judgment makes it impossible to distinguish merely entertaining a proposition from making an assertion (p. 5) (...) Thus Arnault and Nicole use the terms 'judgment' and 'proposition' interchangeably (p. 8)".

Bally's *modus-dictum* construal of the utterance (Bally 1932) constitutes a major advance in this respect in that the relation defining modalisation is clearly distinguished from predication with the modal copula no longer being situated between subject and predicate but explicitly now between the *dictum* and the modal subject – that is, externally to the predicative construct. In this way modalisation is seen to involve a relation which is separate from the one involved in predication:

- (6) <subject-predicate> - modal copula - modal subject (Bally)
- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|----------------|
| dictum | \ | modus / |
| <i>(idée modale, sujet modal)</i> | | |

But again, no separate place is given over to the operation of validation, which still falls, as it were, between the two stools of predication and modalisation. Nor does the *modus-dictum* approach offer any obvious way to account for differences in modal scope.

In the *Theory of Enunciative Operations*, modalisation may be defined as a locating operation in which the locator term is provided by the S-parameter coordinate of the enunciative origin. This general characterisation needs however to be nuanced in order to be able to take on board various eventualities, not least the following:

(a) cases where the modal source is identified with a *derived* subjective origin, as typically occurs with reported speech and represented thought, where the derived modal source of the embedded utterance coincides with the referent of a syntactically-represented participant (underlined in the following examples):

- (a) She said/thought that he had stolen it. (standard indirect style)
- (b) Laura wished now that she was not holding that piece of bread-and-butter, but there was nowhere to put it, and she couldn't possibly throw it away. (K. Mansfield) (standard indirect and free indirect style)

(b) cases where the modal source is of a generic kind, i.e. objective, universal statements, valid for any potential enunciator, which in T.O.E. are taken to involve location relative to the *class* of enunciators (by definition including So²⁴):

- (a) *The sun rises in the East.*
- (b) *Water boils at 100° celsius.*

24. On our reading, the relation of inclusion requires that the class in question be assigned derived origin status: $\lambda \text{ loc Sod.k} (\supset \text{So})$.

3.1. The *locatum* term (modalisation)


Turning now to the problem of defining the *located* term (the *locatum*) in the modalisation relation, this is complicated by the need to take into account different types of modal scope, not least the traditional *de dicto/de re* distinction. Bouscaren & Chuquet (1987) for example formulate the opposition between epistemic and root modalities as one of incidence of the modal operator to respectively (i) the relation between the enunciator and a propositional content as represented by the predicative relation in the former case, and (ii) the relation between the grammatical subject of the utterance and the predicate in the case of the latter²⁵. This formulation however is not entirely satisfactory, not least in so far as it introduces a dissymmetry by positing, on the one hand, incidence to a relation in the case of epistemic modality, and on the other hand, incidence to the *product* of a relation in the case of root modality.

In order to clarify this point, I shall adopt the position that the operation defining modalisation – whatever the kind of scope involved – is best construed as one involving **incidence to the locating operator in a lower relation**. This hypothesis brings up the need to distinguish between two different ways in which relations can combine:

- (i) one in which the *locatum* term is constituted by the product *en bloc* of a lower relation as shown in (7)²⁶, a configuration which is encountered, amongst others, in the case of validation:

(7) <**x loc y**> loc z

- (ii) another, as shown in (8), in which the *locatum* term is constituted by the *locating operator itself* in the lower relation, an eventuality which results in what might be construed as “specification” of the locating operator in question. This, I take to be the case with modalisation:

(8) <x **loc** y> - z


3.2. *DE DICTO*

By confronting these two combining modes with the event/ property distinction, a more complete representation of utterances marked for *de dicto* type modality is now possible. This is shown in (9) where,

25. Cf. op.cit. p. 37.

26. The *locatum* term is given in bold.

crucially, *assertive* modality is taken to involve *zero modulation* (or “zero-specification”) of the locator implicated in the relation defining validation^{27/28}.

- (9)
- event: <<Co loc₁ pred> loc₂ T2> loc₃ To / So

$\begin{array}{c} (\in/\notin) \\ \uparrow \quad \text{(m)} \end{array}$

<i>Liz played (didn't play) the piano last night.</i>	∅
<i>Liz may (not) play the piano this evening.</i>	possible
<i>Liz must have played the piano last night.</i>	necessary

 - property: <Co loc₁ pred> loc₂ To / So

$\begin{array}{c} (\in/\notin) \\ \uparrow \quad \text{(m)} \end{array}$

<i>John is (not) English; Liz plays/doesn't play the piano.</i>	∅
<i>John may (not) be English; Liz may (not) play the piano.</i>	possible
<i>John must be English; Liz must play the piano because...</i>	necessary

The way in which the two operations are seen to interlink is captured by the glosses given in (10), adapted from Dufaye (2001: 24) where, on my reading, the first clause may be taken to refer to the operation of modalisation and the second to validation:

- (10) [modality] [validation]
 It is the case | that *p* is/is not the case
 It is possible | that *p* is/is not the case
 It is necessary | that *p* is/is not the case²⁹

27. The view that assertive modality represents the degree zero of modalisation is encountered *inter alia* in Simonin-Grumbach (1975: 117), Rivière (1991: 177) and Le Goffic (1993: 93).

28. This no doubt explains why validation and assertive modality are frequently conflated. The illusiveness of the operation of validation may also be attributed to the fact that it has no direct marker of its own: as noted above, it is perhaps apprehended in its purest form – that is, shorn of assertive modality – in cases where it is preconstructed.


29. In a relational approach such as the one being advocated here, cases where negation is said to affect “the event” or the “proposition” (as opposed to the modal operator) require to be reformulated as negation incident to the relation defining validation: “it is necessary, possible, predictable, etc. that <p> is not validated” (<p> (loc T2) \notin To).

3.3. *DE RE*

With the kinds of modality traditionally classified as exhibiting *de re* type incidence, the situation is more complex due to the distinction that needs to be operated within this category between, on the one hand, *deontic* root modality and, on the other, root modality of an ascriptive kind (cf. *dynamic* modality, Palmer (1990)):

- (a) deontic root modality: *She must do it now, You can't sit there...*
 (b) ascriptive root modality: *Liz can/can't swim, This vegetable may be eaten raw, A door must be either open or closed.*

In the case of ascriptive root modality an obvious correlation may be seen to hold with the property-utterance configuration and, in line with the standard intra-predicative analysis of root modality, the modal operator will be taken here to be incident to the relation obtaining between the grammatical subject and the other members of the predicative relation. This entails then, according to the position set out above (cf. combining modes), that it is the locating operator in what is traditionally regarded as the relation defining predication, rather than the operator in the relation defining validation, that functions as *locatum* here³⁰:



It may be noted in passing that the resulting dissociation that occurs here between the relation targeted by the modal operator and the relation defining validation is largely in phase with the position generally adopted in T.O.E. since Gilbert (1987), *viz.* that in examples such as *Liz can/can't swim*, the modal auxiliary is the marker of a predicative-level operation resulting in what is tantamount to the assertion of a possibility:

30. In T.O.E., predication is taken to be a “polyoperation” involving a bundle of relations obtaining between the members of the predicative construct, not just that between the grammatical subject and predicate.

Avec *can*, l'énonciateur affirme une possibilité ; avec *can't*, une impossibilité. (Bouscaren & Chuquet, 1987: 49)


3.4. Deontic modality

It will be assumed that the defining characteristic of deontic modality resides in the fact that the validation (or non-validation, in the case of negative polarity) of the state-of-affairs represented by the predicative relation is contingent on the agentive intervention of a participant, typically the grammatical subject. In consequence, the validation or non-validation of the predicative construct comes to be the object simultaneously of two levels of subjective anticipation, viz. (i) teleonomic targeting on the part of the modal source and (ii) anticipation associated with the teleonomy of agency³¹. For this reason the incidence of the modal operator in the case of this type of modality is, at one level at least, not seen to be fundamentally different from that posited for *de dicto* modality, that is, involving a form of specification of the relation defining validation.

Using the bifurcation system of representation, the double characteristic of this type of modality may be formulated as involving two distinct teleonomic operations where the *telos* – the validation or non-validation of the predicative relation in question in both cases – involves a *shared* predicative relation. This is shown in (12), where the IE position is identified respectively with (a) the enunciator functioning as modal source (on the right) and (b) the grammatical subject – or more precisely the source argument of the lexis – functioning as potential agent (on the left)³²:

31. Teleonomic targeting brings into play *evaluative* modality in so far as the anticipated validation value (constituting the *telos*) is necessarily the object of positive or negative valuation on the part of the modal source. For this reason, deontic modality and boulomaic modality, which also involves teleonomic targeting, are perhaps better treated as exponents of a more general category which might be called *teleonomic-based modality*. On the role of teleonomy in agentivity, cf. Culioli (1999a: 100) and Groussier & Rivière (1996: 13-14).


32. When passivation occurs, the origin of the latter teleonomic operation no longer coincides with the grammatical subject and may not even be syntactically expressed (e.g. *The Logo may not be used by non-members; This forum may not be used to obtain, sell, or give away prescription drugs*).



From the point of view of the way in which the two bifurcations combine, it will be assumed that the one associated with the enunciator functioning as deontic source is *superordinate*, so that the enunciator’s targeting of the validation of the predicative relation comes to intercept and control that of the agentive grammatical subject. This approach logically allows for the possibility for the polarity values targeted by the two respective teleonomic sources to be either concordant or discordant, as illustrated in (13), where the notation S.ag is used to denote the grammatical subject as agent³³:

- (13)
- (permission) *You may sit down.* (concordance: So -> I / S.ag -> I)
- (willingness) *John’ll help us.* (concordance: So -> I / S.ag -> I)
- (interdiction) *Passengers may not eat below.* (discord.: So -> E / S.ag -> I)
- (absence of willingness) *He won’t do it.* (discord.: So -> I / S.ag -> E)

An alternative representation of the two hierarchically-arranged targeting operations is given in (14), which shows perhaps a little more clearly how the agent’s targeting of the validation (or non-validation) of the predicative relation is intercepted and controlled by the enunciator functioning as deontic source:



33. Cf. Gilbert (1987, 2001) and Dufaye (2001) for an analysis of deontic values in a similar perspective.

CONCLUSION

The location theory approach to the fundamental form of the utterance adopted in this article has made it possible to formulate the difference between the operations of validation and modalisation in the following way:

- Validation, construed as a submodal operation via which the predicative relation takes on a stabilized referential value, is characterised as a *T-indexed* operation in which the *locatum* term is provided by either (i) the predicative relation *en bloc* in the case of property utterances or (ii) the quantifiabilised predicative construct (defined here as the product of the $\langle \lambda \rangle$ loc T2 relation) in the case of eventive utterances.
- Modalisation is characterised as a fundamentally *S-indexed* operation by means of which the modal source brings to bear a judgment on either (i) the enunciative-level relation defining validation in the case of *de dicto* type and deontic type modalities³⁴, or (ii) the predicative-level \langle Co-predicate \rangle relation in the case of ascriptive type *de re* modality.

More technically still, it has been argued that the relations defining the two operations in question are interlocking and that they are hierarchically arranged with modalisation being the higher of the two. In the majority of cases, the relations are seen to combine by virtue of the location operator in the lower relation (defining validation) providing the *locatum* term of the higher relation (defining modalisation). Ascriptive root modality however constitutes an exception in this respect, the *locatum* term being taken in this case to be the locating operator of the predicative-level \langle Co-predicate \rangle relation.

A consequence of our approach is that so-called assertive polarity and, by extension, polarity associated with other forms of modality (symbolised here by the $\underline{\epsilon}/\underline{\text{g}}$ opposition) comes – at least in the case of existential-type negation – to be situated submodally at the level of the relation defining validation (or predication in the case of ascriptive-root modality). This entails that, from the point of view of bifurcation representation, being situated at the E position of the plane of validation requires to be construed as designating negatively-polarized validation rather than non-validation.

34. In the case of assertive modality, this is taken to involve “zero-modulation” of the operator in question.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ARNAULT A. & NICOLE P (1662 [1992]): *La logique ou l'art de penser*, Editions Gallimard, Paris.
- BALLY C. (1932): *Linguistique générale et linguistique française*, Editions Francke, Berne.
- BOUSCAREN J. & CHUQUET J. (1987): *Grammaire et textes anglais. Guide pour l'analyse linguistique*, Paris, Ophrys.
- BUROKER VANCE J. (1993): "Judgment and Predication in the Port-Royal Logic". In: *The Great Arnault and some of his Philosophical Correspondents*, Kremer E. (ed.), University of Toronto Press, p. 3-27.
- CULIOLI A. (1985): *Notes du séminaire de DEA, 1983-84*, Université de Paris 7, DRL et Poitiers.
- CULIOLI A. (1990): *Pour une linguistique de l'énonciation*, t.1, Paris, Ophrys.
- CULIOLI A. (1999a): *Pour une linguistique de l'énonciation*, t.2, Paris, Ophrys.
- CULIOLI A. (1999b): *Pour une linguistique de l'énonciation*, t.3, Paris, Ophrys.
- CULIOLI A. (2001): "Heureusement !" in *Saberes no tempo, Homenagem a Maria Henriquez Costa Campos*, Lisbon, p. 279-284.
- CULIOLI A. et al. (1981): *Systèmes de représentations linguistiques et métalinguistiques. Les catégories grammaticales et le problème de la description de langues peu étudiées*. Rapport présenté à l'UNESCO. Collection ERA 642, Paris, Université de Paris 7.
- DUCROT O. & SCHAEFFER J.-M. (1995): *Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage*, Editions du Seuil.
- DUFAYE L. (2001): *Les modaux et la négation en anglais contemporain*, numéro spécial, *Cahiers de Recherche en Linguistique Anglaise*, Paris, Ophrys.
- FREGE G. (1918): "Der Gedanke" [English translation, Geach P. "The Thought", *Mind*, vol. 65, 1956].
- FREGE G. (1969): *Nachgelassene Schriften [Posthumous Writings*, trad. Long P. and White R., Blackwell, 1979].
- GILBERT E. (1987): *May, Must, Can et les opérations énonciatives*, numéro spécial, *Cahiers de Recherche en Linguistique Anglaise*, T.3, Paris, Ophrys.
- GILBERT E (2001): "Vers une analyse unitaire des modalités", *Cahiers de recherche en grammaire anglaise*, T.8, Paris, Ophrys, p. 23-99.
- GROUSSIÉRE M.-L. & RIVIÈRE C. (1996): *Les mots de la linguistique: lexique de linguistique énonciative*, Paris, Ophrys.
- LE GOFFIC P. (1978): "L'assertion dans la grammaire et la logique de Port-Royal". In: *Stratégies discursives*, Actes de colloque, Presses universitaires de Lyon, p. 235-244.
- LE GOFFIC P. (1993) : *Grammaire de la Phrase Française*, Hachette.
- PAILLARD D. (1992) : "Réperage : construction et spécification". In : *La théorie d'Antoine Culioli : ouverture et incidences*, Paris, Ophrys, p. 75-88.
- PALMER F. R. (1990): *Modality and the English Modals*, Longman.

- RIVIÈRE C. (1991): “Les adjectifs de modalité”, *Cahiers de Recherche*, T.5, Paris, Ophrys, p. 155-183.
- SIMONIN-GRUMBACH J. (1975): “Pour une typologie des discours”. In : Kristeva J. et al. (eds.), *Langue, discours, société : pour Emile Benveniste*, Paris, Seuil, p. 85-121.
- WYLD H. (2001): *Subordination et énonciation*, numéro spécial, *Cahiers de Recherche en Linguistique Anglaise*, Paris, Ophrys.
- WYLD H. (2010): “From verbal notions to the linguistic representation of events”, unpublished paper, International Conference, *The Representation of Events*, Université Paris 3 Sorbonne Nouvelle, October 2010.
- WYLD H. (2014): “Constructing reality: on the operation of validation in T.O.E.”. In : *Du réel à l'irréel - 1, Travaux Linguistiques du CerLiCO*, 25, Presses universitaires de Rennes, p.279-302.